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Sovereignty and Crimea: How Referendum Democracy
Complicates Constituent Power in Multinational Societies
By Stephen Tierney
Abstract
This article examines the specific issue of the referendum as an instrument in the re-
ordering of territory, specificallyin the context of the secession of Crimea from Ukraine.
The article maps howin recent decades independence referendums have proliferated and
considers how the Crimean situation exposes the deep pathology of uncertainty in
international law and its understanding of self-determination, exposing the referendum as
a dangerous outlier. The principle of democracy, present already in the context of Kosovo's
unilateral independence, and which forced the hand of Canada and the UK to
accommodate secessionist aspirations, is a growing feature of international legal
discourse, and one which suggests that the referendum is likely to remain a potential
trump card to which nationalists will appeal to overcome both constitutional impediments
and the black holeof international lawinthe path toward statehood.
A. Introduction
On 16 March 2014, a referendum was held in Crimea on its future status as a territory. This
event was deeply controversial because it was organized against the backdrop of Russian
intervention and the Ukrainian Government, which had no involvement in the process
challenging its legality.' This article observes that the focal-point for the territorial
reorganization which many ethnic Russians sought to achieve-as it has been in so many
places over the past twenty five years-was an exercise in direct democracy. The Crimean
process is the latest example of a trend in which the referendum has become the default
device for sub-state nationalist movements wishing to appeal to their own host state
and/or to the international community in pursuit of a sovereignty claim. It is frequently
observed that the legal principles of territorial integrity and self-determination have been
in flux since 1990 when the USSR and SFRY started to unravel. 2 What is less often discussed
Universityof Edinburgh.
Mark Weller, Analysis: Why Russia's Crimea Move Fails Legal Test, BBC NEws (Mar. 7, 2014),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-26481423 (last visitedJune 18, 2015).
2 Zoran Oklopcic, Which Pluralimn? External Self-determination at the Intersection of National, Social and
Geopolitical Emancpation, in NATIONALISM AND GLOBALISATION (Stephen Tierneyed., forthcoming 2015).
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is the crucial legitimating function performed by direct democracy in these processes, a
tendency which has continued in subsequent situations where a change of status has been
atstake, including Eritrea, EastTimor, Montenegro and South Sudan.
This article examines the specific issue of the referendum as an instrument in the re-
ordering of territory. It begins by briefly mapping how, in recent decades, the referendum
has proliferated, and how territorial and sovereignty issues have been at the heart of this
proliferation (Part B). The article then considers how the Crimean situation exposes the
deep pathology of uncertainty in this area, with doctrines such as self-determination and
territorial integrity variously overlapping and conflicting with other areas of international
law including human rights, the prohibition of the use of force, and the principle of
democracy. Together this helps create a situation ripe for political manipulation (Part C).
One issue which emerges in the Crimean debate-as it did in relation to the Kosovo crisis
of 1998-99 and the subsequent move by states to recognize Kosovo as a State-is the
relationship between legality and legitimacy. In Part D, this article considers how the
referendum has assumed such importance on account of its purported capacity to fill the
legitimacy gap. In this context, one must ask: what is it about the referendum as a specific
type of electoral event that is so unsettling for international law? This leads to the final
section which addresses other recent claims which havethe referendum as a focal point, in
particular the 1995 referendum in Quebec and the recent independence referendum in
Scotland, each of which in effect are territorial claims directed internally to the host state
as interlocutor rather than externally to the international community. These processes
required the host state to reflect upon-and in turn justify-the democratic principles
which underpin its own consttutional order. When there is, however, deep dissensus
within the state, and claims fall back on international law, the situation in the Crimea
shows an unclear and unsettled international regime, into which the referendum emerges
as a dangerous, but potent, outlier. The principle of democracy, however, which forced the
hand of the host state in Canada and the UK is a growing feature of international legal
discourse, and one which suggests that the referendum is likely to remain a potential
trump card to which nationalists will appeal to overcome both constitutional impediments
and the black hole of international law in the path to statehood. It is also clear that the
moral force of the referendum-even when the context within, and process by, which it is
it organized are both deeply suspect-can provide an unstoppable momentum towards
secession inthe face of the collapsing normativeauthority of international law.
See generally MATT QVORTRUP, REFEREN DUMS AND ETHNIC CONFLICT (2014).
4 STEPHEN TIERNEY, CONSTTTUTIcNAL LAW AND NATIONAL PLURALISM 293-99 (2004); STEPHEN TIERNEY, DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN
THE UNITED KINGDOM: REFLECTIONS FROMTHE SCOTTSH INDEPENDENCE REFERENDUM (forthcomng Public Law, 2015).
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B. The Proliferation of Constitutional Referendums: the Territorial Dimension
Over the past four decades the referendum has become a fixed feature of state and
constitution-building across the globe. In Table 1, I offer a breakdown of how the use of
referendums has grown infour mainareas of constitutional practice.
Table 1
4 TYPESOF REFERENDUM EXAMPLES
IN THE "NEW WAVE"
Founding of new states a New states emerging from the former
USSR and SFRY (1990-1992)
* Eritrea (1993), East Timor (1999),
Montenegro (2006), South Sudan (2011)
Creation and amendment * Former republics of the USSR and SFRY
of new constitutions * Iraq- ratification ofthe Constitution (2005)
* Egypt - constitutional reforms (2011)
Sub-state autonomy * Spain referendums: e.g. Basque Country
(1979), Catalonia (1979),Galicia(1980)
* United Kingdom referendums: Scotland
(1997), Wales (1997) and (2011), Northern
Ireland (1998)
European Union: treaty-
making processes in * Malta; Slovenia; Hungary; Lithuania;
respect of both Slovakia; Poland; Czech Republic; Estonia;
integrationand accession Latvia (2004)
* Croatia (2012)
The aspirations of sub-state peoples for constitutional change have been key to the
proliferation of the referendum. It has been central to the founding of newStates, and-as
the referendum held in Scotand in September 2014 and the ongoing efforts by Catalan
nationalists to hold a referendum on sovereignty each demonstrate-the referendum is




now an automatic procedural move for nationalists seeking to present claims to
independent statehood today. Referendums were once rarely used in the creation or
amendment of constitutions, but throughout Central and Eastern Europe and more
recently in Iraq and Egypt, the referendum has emerged both in the founding of new
constitutions and within the text of these constitutions as part of future amendment
procedures. This can also be traced to the sub-state process because many of those sub-
state peoples in Central and Eastern Europe who achieved statehood by way of a
referendum either had a subsequent referendum to ratify the new constitution and/or
included the referendum in the new constitution as central to future processes of
constitutional amendment.6 The referendums on accession to treaty development of the
EU do not raise sub-state issues, but they do offer evidence of this general turn towards
popular democracy: of the first fifteen member states, only Denmark and Ireland turned to
the referendum inthe accession process; of the ten joining in 2004, onlyCyprus did not.8
It is often assumed that the referendum is of use to sub-state groups simply as a device
with which to break-up of multinational states. But referendums are also central -as a
sub-set of the second group in Table 1-in establishing complex new models of sub-state
autonomy as we have seen in Spain and the UK in the late 1970s and 1990s respectively,0
and in ongoing processes of constitutional change such as the referendum on further
devolution for Wales in 2011". A related example is the referendum on the draft
Charlottetown Accord in 1992 in which Quebec and the rest of Canada respectively held
distinct referendum processes. 2 In other words, the referendum is also central to those
forms of territorial reorganization which stop short of statehood. Sub-state peoples can
seethe referendum as a mechanism bywhichtheir demotic specificity is recognized within
the state; secession is not the only route to recognition, but it is a popular goal and will
remainso particularlywhen aspirationstowards greater autonomy remain frustrated.
STEPHEN TIERNEY, THE REFERENDUM IN !IiJLTI-LEVEL STATES: FRACTURING OR FOSTERING FEDERAL MODELS OF GOVERNMENT?
The Federal Idea (2014).
TIERNEY, supra note 5, at 305-12 (2012).
Id. at 6.
QVORTRUP, supra note 3, at48.
0 TIERNEY, supra note 4, at 152, 285, 299-301.
"See generally R. WYN JONES & R. SCULLY, WALES SAYS YEs: WELSH DEVOUTION AND TI E 2011 WELSH REFERENLi M (2012)
12TIERNEY, supra note 4, at 141.
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C. Referendum in Crimea: The Crisis in Legality
The Crimean situation demonstrates just how confused, contested, and messy the state of
international law is when territorial claims to independent statehood or irredentism arise.
It is often noted that international law, although giving no right to secession except
possibly in the most extreme cases of internal oppression, 13 is in a sense neutral on the
issue. This by definition creates a grey area. If international law is neutral, what steps can
lawfully be taken either to affector to resist secession? To add to the conceptual difficulty,
attempts to secede rarely play out in practice as self-contained processes. Instead, they
invariably raise ancillary legal issues. The Crimean case demonstrates how territorial
questions are made more complex by the way the issue of self-determination interacts
(often in fraught situations of armed conflict) not only with territorial integrity and the
question of state dissolution, but also with other values and legal principles such as
prohibition of the use of force, claims to democracy, "humanitarian" intervention, and the
possible forfeit of a state's entitlement to territorial integrity in light of flagrant human
rights abuses. These different factors often interact in contradictory ways, and are
variously prayed inaidfor,or used to strengthen denials ofterritorial claims.15
An example of the vagueness of the law of secession is the obscure opinion given by the ICJ
in the Kosovo Advisory Opinion.16 This opinion drew a distinction between the entitlement
to declare independence on the one hand and the right to effect it on the other hand. The
Court concluded that international law does not generally prohibit unilateral declarations
of independence because the principle of territorial integrity only applies in the relations
between States and not in regard to internal secessionist movements. It does not take a
great leap of imagination to see how this fine distinction drawn by the Court could serve
only to further confuse what was already a highly complex and contested issue. Indeed, it
can reasonably be argued that the IC. opinion-by suggesting that agitating for
independence to the point of declaring such a status-is not unlawful under international
law,seems to offer a green lightto secessionist movements.
However, this position is qualified. One area of focus for the Court, which it does taketo be
important to the context in which declarations are made, is the use of force. The Court
goes on to say that unilateral declarations of independence can violate international law
13 Reference ReSecession ofQuebec, [1998] 2 5.C.R. 217, para. 112(Ca n.) [hereinafter Re Secession].
14 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo,
Advisory Opinion, 20101.C.J.403, 438, para.84 (July 22) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion].
"Anne Peters, Does "The West" Now Pay the Pricefor Kosovo, EJIL:TALKI BLOc(Apr. 22, 2014).
'"Advisory Opinion, supra note 14, at 423, 438, para. 84.
' Id. at 423, 425, paras. 51, 56.
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where they "were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other
egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a
peremptory character (jus cogens)."' At a theoretical level, this is not an unreasonable
distinction. In the highly fraught environment of disputed territorial claims, however,
where secession attempts and the use of force-the legality of which is itself often deeply
contested-are so often intertwined, it should be no surprise that this aspect of the
Opinion has resulted indifferinginterpretations bydifferent actors.
Certainly Crimean Russians were keen to seize upon the CJ's statementon declarations of
independence as affirmation of their right to move towards independence. On 11 March
2014,the Supreme Council of Crimea (Crimea's Parliament) proclaimed that itwas acting:
[w]ith regard to the charter of the United Nations and a
whole range of other international documents and taking
into consideration the confirmation of the status of
Kosovo by the United Nations Intemational Court of
Justice on July 22, 2010, which says that unilateral
declaraton of independence by a part of the country
doesn't violate any international norms.
On the other hand it has been forcefully argued that Crimea's declaration of independence
is illegal because it relied upon an illegal use of force. At the time of the referendum,
Russian soldiers occupied the territory. As Marksen argues:
In regard to Crimea, the declaraton of independence
would have been impossible without Russian troops
backing up the steps towards secession. Only the fact that
Ukrainian forces on Crimea have been locked in their
posts and that the public infrastructure has been taken
over by pro-Russian forces made it possible to hold the
referendum on which the declaration of independence is
based. It can therefore hardly be argued that the
declaraton would not rely on the use of force. According
to the criteria elaborated in the ICJ's advisory opinion, if
that use of force was illegal, so was the declaration of
independence.20
"Id. at438, para.8.
SChristian Marksen, Ctnea'sDedarationofindependence, EJIL:TALKI Bwc(Mar. 18, 2014).
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Similarly, Milanovic draws a clear line between Crimea and Kosovo, with the use of force
the critical pointof distinction:
Crimea's secession is the direct result of Russia's unlawful
military interventon against Ukraine, whereas Kosovo's
secession was not tainted to the same extent by NATO's
1999 intervention due to the subsequent adoption of
Resolution 1244, which authorized the presence of
internatonal forces in Kosovo while disabling Serbia from
taking military action to suppress Kosovo's secession.2
But even the use of force delimitation on secession can be a difficult issue to assess in
practice. In a debate about territory and sovereignty, opinions about who is actually using
force unlawfully can shift rapidly depending upon conditions on the ground. If there is an
armed insurrection in pursuit of secession, even one supported externally by another
state, at what point do counter-measures taken by the host state themselves violate the
prohibiton on the use of force or international human rights norms? Also, when- if
ever-does the reaction of the host state entitle an external power or powers to intervene,
claiming humanitarian conditions asa pretext?
All of these questions inevitably drew the 1998-1999 international intervention in
Kosovo-and Kosovo's subsequent move to independent statehood-into the Crimean
debate. In Kosovo, the self-determination issue was not only murky due to its link to the
path dependency of the Badinter process, 2 but also precisely because of this question of
"humanitarian intervention." The author has argued elsewhere that it was the denial of a
21 M rl<o Manovic, Cimea, Kosovo, Hobgoblins and Hypocrisy, EJIL: TALK! BLOG (Mar. 20, 2014). See aiso Peters,
supra note 15. She distinguishes Kosovo from the Crimean situaton. Id. She argues that the use of
forcefntervention in Kosovo are legallyseparate from Kosovo's secession while the use of force in Crimes is
central tothe process leading to its secession. She goes on to reject the argument that the West's conduct over
Kosovo weakens criticisms of Russian action in Ukraine/Crimea. id.
22 Five states emerged from the dissolution ofthe Socialist Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (SFRY). On 27 April 1992
two ofthe six republics of the SFRY-Serba and Montenegro-forrned the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia which
was considered by the EC Peace Conferenre Arbitration Commission to be a new state. Conference on Yugoslavia
Arbitration Commission (the Badinter Commission), Opinions on Question Arising from the Dissolution of
Yugoslavia, (1992) Opnion No. 9. The FRY was recognized by member states of the European Community
following the Dayton Agreement ofl4 December 1995. The other four republics became independent states:
Bosnia-Herzegovna, Croata, Macedonia and Slovena. In due course Montenegro would itself become
independent following a referendum in 2006.
Kosovo was not e igible toapplyto the Badinter Commission for recognition; and for Kosovars, conscious of the
autonomy they had enjoyed under the 1974 Constitution, which in their eyes accorded Kosovo de facto
republican status, and bearing in mind that Kosovo with a population which was approximately ninety percent
ethnic Albanian was the most ethnically homoneous autonomous unit in the Federal Republic apart from
Slovenia, it seemed pa rticularly unjust that Kosovo should be excluded from any pDssibility ofstatehoodsimply on
account of a formal distinction in the l974SFRY constitution between republics and autonomous provinces.
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territorial solution to the Kosovo crisis which played possibly a determinative role in
sparking the intervention by Western powers with a "self-determination intervention"
motivation in addition to-and perhaps even more than-a "humanitarian intervention"
dynamic. In any event, the culmination of the UN intervention has been a slow but
inexorableroadto Kosovo's statehood.
Kosovo's acquisition of statehood is the first casein which a territory of theformer SFRY or
USSR which was not a republic under the former constitution of either state has achieved
widespread recognition as a state.24 It did not fit criteria for recognition laid down by the
major international powers in thewake of the "dissolution" of the state, as adjudicated by
Badinter.25 Inevitably, this has led to a discussion of the extent to which Kosovo acts as a
precedent for the Crimean situation. In recognizing Kosovo as an independent state, a
number of states argued that Kosovo was an exceptional case dueto the history of conflict
there, the human rights abuses which sparked the intervention that preceded its move to
statehood, and even its relationship to the collapse of the SFRY. It is not surprisinl
however, that others are not willing to accept that the violation of Serbia's territorial
integrity against its will contains no implications for any other situation. This has led other
sub-state nationalists, including those in Crimea, to consider the opposition of the host
state not an insurmountable barrier-in legal as well as practical terms-to statehood and
to recognition. It is not convincing to compare how Kosovars were treated by the FRY in
1998 with how Crimean Russians were treated by Ukraine in the run up to the referendum
in Crimea. For example, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
RightS26 rejected Russian claims that there were widespread and systematic human rights
violations of Ukrainians with Russian ethnicity, which justified both the Russian
intervention and claims of a right to secede. The fact is, however, that the Kosovo
intervention and the Kosovo opinion of the ICJ serve to muddy what were already pretty
murky waters. As Marksenargues:
23 Stephen Tierney, The Long Intervation in Kosovo: A Self-Determination Impemtive?, in KOSOVO AND
INTERNAlIONAL LAw 249-78 (James Summers ed., 2011).
24 For example, on 18 February 2008 the EU presidency announced that member states were free to decide
Individuallywhether toremgnize Kosovo's independence most have doneso.
" For Kosovars, conscous of the autonomy they had enjoyed under the 1974 Consttution, whch in their eyes
accorded KOSDvo de facto republican status, and bearing in mind that Kosovo with a population which was
approximately ninety percent ethnic Albanian was the most ethnically homogeneous autonomous unit in the
Federal Republic apart from Slovenia, it seemed particularly unjust that KosDvo should be excluded from any
possibilityof statehoodsimply on account of a formal distinction in the 1974 SFRY constitution between republics
and autonormus prDVnrwes.
2E Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine, Office ofthe United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights of 15 April 2014.
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Since Russia is powerful enough to pursue its interests
anyway, it does not need an ultimately convincing legal
justification. A justification that is at least not totally
absurd, but somehow arguable, is already good enough
for making a case in the intemational political sphere. In
expanding the right to self-deternination in regard to
Kosovo, Western states bear their share of responsibility
in enabling such arguments and in undernining
international law. 27
Since 1945, the law of self-determination has always been open to political manipulation
given its importance, its close connection to principles of political legitimacy, and the area
of uncertainty introduced by the UN General Assembly in relation to exceptional cases of
internal oppression.28 Generally, however, it was accepted that any legal right to secession
which came with the right to self-determination, applied only to colonized territories and
was therefore consigned to history with the virtual completion of European decolonization.
The Kosovo recognition has breathed life into a dying horse and in doing so has given
clever lawyers an opening to argue that, on the basis of the law's obscurity and
malleability, one case is pretty much as strong as another. In this area of the law,
therefore, it is not necessarily the strength of one's arguments that matter, but the
opportunity to present a case-which would previously have been seen as entirely
implausible-as being at least arguable: "[W]e may be wrong but there is no certainty that
you are right." As Milanovic argues, "Even if Kosovo and Crimea are legally distinguishable,
they are still close enough. The West's position on Crimea is undeniably undermined by
their previous stance regarding Kosovo, and they can only blame themselves forthat."29
It seems that the IC's opinion has done more harm than good, not only in the casuistic
distinction between a declaration of independence and an entitlement to independence,
but also on account of what it did notsay. It did not deal with the real issues that Serbia
sought to put to it: Whether Kosovo had a right to secession, whether there is such a
generalizable right under international law, or what the legal consequences of the Kosovo
declaration might be.30 What we are left with therefore are new gaps in an already
fragmented legal regime, new ambiguities, and, most regrettably, new opportunities for
opportunists to use these to bolster their political goals.
27 Marl<sen,supr note 19.
28 UN General Assembly Declaration 2625 which in a general commitment to the territorial integrityand political
unity of sovereign and independent states hints that a state's entitlement to territorial integrity might be
weakened if the state is not conducting itself, "in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-
determination of peoples," and specifically where t is not, "possessed ofa government representing the whole
people belongingto the territorywithout distinction astorace, creed or color."
29 Mile novic,supr note 21.
3n Advisory Opinion, supra note 14, at 403, 423, 425, pa ras. 51, 56.
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D. Legality and Legitimacy: The Referendum Fills the Gap?
International law does not make itself less vulnerable to intractability and
incommensurability when the boundaries between legality and legitimacy are themselves
obscured. In other words, not only is the law obscure, it is not even the only game in town.
With the Kosovo crisis, we saw legality seep into the related but entirely open-ended
notion of legitimacy which was presented as a feasible alternativeto legality injustification
for international action which would otherwise itself be unlawful. We see this set out
starkly in relation to the "humanitarian" intervention which was described by one
significantreportas "illegal but legitimate."3 1
Peters argues that one of the key distinctions between the Kosovo and Crimean cases is
that that the use of force and the international intervention in Kosovo are legally separate
from Kosovo's secession whereas in Ukraine and Crimea the two acts are inseparable. 32 But
she also concedes that if it is the case that either or both the Kosovo intervention or the
Kosovo secession was illegal, and the justification for either is instead "legitimacy," the
Western powers have "a problem of credibility":
Actors who breached the law in a previous case sound
hypocritical when they point their finger to another
actor's violations of the law. This is not only a matter of
politics, but raises the legal problem of double standards.
Applying double standards is extremely pernicious for the
rule of law and fairness. One of the core elements of the
rule of law is the principle thatlike cases must be treated
alike. However, the principle of equal treatment cannot
apply in the realm of unlawful behaviour, because this
31 THE INDEPENDENT INTERNAllONAL COMMISSION aj Kosovo, THE KosovO REPORT: CONFLICT, INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE,
LESSONS LEARNED 4 (2000). This position was also taken by a UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee
Report-HC Foreign Affairs Committee Fourth Report, para.138 (May 23, 2000). For related arguments, see also,
Nic Schrijver, NATO in Kosovo: Humanitarian Intervention turns into Von Clausewitz War, 1 INTL L. F. 155-59
(1999). Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria lus Oritur: Are We Moving Towards international Legitimation of Forcible
Humanitaian Countermeasures in the World Community?, 10 EUR. ]. INTfL L. 23-30 (1999); Abraham Sofaer,
International Law and Kosovo, 36 STAN.J. INT'LL. 4 (2000). See also Nico Schrijver, NATO in Kosovo: Humanitarian
Intervention Turns into Von Clausewitz War, 1 INiL L. FoRuM 155-59 (1999); Abraham Solaer, International Law
and Kosovo, 4 STAN.J.INtL. L. 36 (2000). Or other opinions that consider the NATO bombing of FRY to have been
unlawful but wNch are otherwise sympatheIc to NATO's motvations. See Bruno Simma, NATO, the UNandthe
Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 FUR. ]. INFL L 1-22 (1999); Mchael ]. Glennon, The New Intervationism: The
SearchforaJust Internationa/ Law, 78 FOREIGN AFFS.2(1999).
3 Peters, supra note 15.
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would condemn the supervising actors to perpetuate
unlawfulness.3
Peters defends the Kosovo intervention as exceptionally justified "on account of blatant
human rights violations, political marginalization, persistent denial of internal self-
determination of KosovarAlbanians, and as the onlyway out of a stalemate."
Her arguments are not unconvincing; she is also surely correct that opening up the
distinction between legality and legitmacy changes the debate and offers aid to those who
would present the Crimean casein a similar light. When legitimacy is introduced as a factor
that can differ from-but nonetheless rival-legality as a justification for action, it should
be no surprise that we find the salience of the referendum as a player in these disputes
increasing. The referendum intervenes by instantating a dramatic consttuent moment,
encapsulating the democratic voice of a people speaking directly and collectively; in other
words, it offers one moment of apparent democratic clarity to pierce an opaque legal and
political backdrop.
There are two features specific to state-forming and constitution-framing processes
which-from the perspective of civic republicanism-seem to offer a strong prima facie
defense of the deployment of direct democracy that have made the referendum so
attractive to sub-state nationalists seeking to advance the constitutional position of their
own national societies.35 The first is that it serves to highlight the importance of the issue
at stake-the people come together collectively to express their will on a maj or issue, at a
foundational or re-foundational moment for their polity. This is a highly symbolic process
which presents to the people's host state and/or the international community a specific
claim which has the ultimate democratic validation-the expressed will of the people-
unmediated by politicians.This argument builds upon work within the republican revival by
scholars like Bruce Ackerman who argue that constitutional politics is distinct from
ordinary politics, making a compelling case for citizen engagement. 36 Secondly, in such
decisions, the very identity of the people or the demos is inevitably implicated. This is
because they involve constitutive constitutional issues, the most fundamental of which is
the aspiration for a new state or an irredentist move to join an existing state. A
Id.
* Id. But this also serves to nvite questons a bout the rnotiations ofthe povers intervening in the Kosovo crisis.
Among those skeptical of the idea that NATOandatherswere motivated by humanitarian concerns were: NCAM
CHOMSKY, A NEW GENERATION DRAWS THE LINE: Kosovo, EASTTIMOR AND 1HE STANDARDS OF THE WEt (2001); Robert M.
Hayden, Humanitarian Hypocrisy, 8 E. EUR. CONST. REV. 91-96 (1999); CHRISTINE GRAY, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ThE USE
CF FORCE 36 (2000).
Stephen Tierney, Constitutiona Referendums: A Theoretical Enquiry, MoD. L. REv. 360-83(2009).
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 10 (1991).
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referendum not only has instrumental value in presenting a claim based upon the result of
the vote, but, in bringing the people together in one direct constitutional moment, it can
also help to make real the idea of a national people made manifest in the moment of
collective decision-taking. In other words, a constitutional referendum takes on a symbolic
representational role, encapsulating the very political selfhood of the people, while also
embodying its settled will. In turn, individuals can come reflexively to identify with one
another through their shared participation in this process. In the fraught and hazy area of
statehood claims, the practical force and totemic resonance of constitutional referendums
combine into a forceful claimto legitimacy.
The notion of legitimacy in direct democracy, however, needs to be questioned further.
Where does this stem from? It is not simply that the referendum is an exercise in
democracy. The term democracy is itself vague and contested, for example between those
who take respectively liberal or republican approaches, and those who favor direct as
opposed to representative forms. What is more, it has come to be validated more usually
through representative than direct channels. What is particularly legitimizing about the
referendum is that it is as much about the "self" as it is about the "determination" aspect
of self-determination. The crucial feature of a referendum is not the decision on a
particular set of constitutional aspirations, but the nature of the decision-makers. As an
event, the referendum serves to mobilize a sub-state group as a people; the aspirationfor
self-determination and the act of self-determination merge into one another. In a
sovereignty referendum, a sub-state people are not just claiming a right to self-
determination, they are also actively self-determining in the here and now.39 Further, this
has the capacity to develop the identities of the citizens in the process. Not only are they
the authors of a new political regime, but as such they can also undergo through this event
a process of self-authorship, redefining themselves collectively as citizens of the new
polity.
Having said all of this, however, let us not overlook that there was a whole range of
process problems attached to the Crimean referendum, undermining not only claims of
legality, but also those of legitimacy. In the first place, the referendum was organized
against the will of the Ukrainian government. The question that was put to voters and the
timing of the vote are also serious concerns. The referendum asked the people of Crimea
whether they wanted to join Russia as a federal subject, or if they wanted to restore the
1992 Crimean constitution and Crimea's status as a partof Ukraine: the status quo was not
See generally MICHEL ROSENFELD, THE IDENTITY OF THE CONlSTITUllONAL SUBECT: SELFHOOD, CITIZENSHIP, CULTURE AND
COM MUN FrY (2010).
TIERNEY, supra note 5, at 19-57.
Stephen T-erney, We the Peoples: Balancing Constituat Power and Constitutionaism in Plurinational States, in
THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUllONALISM 229-46 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walkereds., 2007).
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an option.40 Also, the final date for the referendum and the ballot choices were set only
ten days before the plebiscite was held.4 ' Again, the turnout and result are deeply
contested. The organizing authorities released their own data, but this is dismissed as
fabricated by the Ukrainian government. Notably, the legality of the referendum was
rejected by the United Nations. Thirteen members of the United Nations Security Council
voted in favor of a resoluton declaring the referendum invalid, but Russia vetoed it and
China abstained. The resolution would have reaffirmed Ukraine's "sovereignty,
independence, unity and territorial integrity" and declared that the referendum "can have
no validity."44 A vote of one hundred in favor and eleven against, with fifty-eight
abstentions, adopted a United Nations General Assembly resolution later, which declared
the referendum invalid and affirmed Ukraine's territorial integrity.4 5
But despite these factors, it is significant that it is upon the referendum that the Crimean
claim to unification with Russia principally rests. Other arguments are presented. There is
the claim that in historical terms the people of Crimea have a strong connection with
Russia. The Crimean Oblast was a subdivision of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist
Republic until the 1954 transfer of Crimea into the Ukrainian SSR. 4 b When Ukraine became
independent after the dissolution of the USSR, Crimea became part of the new
independent state, a process which itself followed a referendum in 1991, the legitimacy
and legality of which was itself questioned by the collapsing Soviet state at the time.4 7
There are also arguments that since then the autonomy of Crimea within Ukraine has been
diminished.
4n Ricmard Balmforth, No Room far 'Nyet' in Ukraine's Crimea Vote to Join Russia, REUTERS, Mar. 11, 2014,
http://www.reuters.cm/article/201403/11/us-ukraine-:rsis-referendum-dUSBREA2A1GR20140311 (last
Vsitedijune 18, 2015).
41 Crimean Pauliament Votes to Join Russia, Sets Referendum Date, NBC NEWS, Ma r. 6, 2014,
http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ulkraine-cris's/crim ean-parliament-vDtes-joi n-russia-sets-referendu rn-date-
n45686 (last visitedJune 18, 2015).
"
2Sam Frizell, Climei Votes to Leave Ukraine for Russia, TIME MAGAZINE, M4ar. 16, 2014. See also lan Birrell,
Crimea's Referendum Was a Sham DispiayofDemocracy THE GUARDIAN, Ma r. 17, 2014 (last visited June 18, 2015).
UN Security Council Action on Crimea Referendum Blocked, UN NEWS CENTRE, IVar. 15, 2014,
http://www.un.org/a pps/news/story.asp?Newsl D-47362#.VQRJXnkSZjo (last visited J ine 18, 2015).
44id.
Backing Ukraine's Territorial Integrity, UNAssembly Dedares Crimea Referendum Invalid, UN NEWS CENTRE, Mar.
27, 2014, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?Newsl D=47443#.VQRKTHk8Zjo (lastvisitedJ une 18, 2015).
4s MARC WELLER & STEFAN WCOLF, AUTONoMY, SELF-GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICT RESOLUTiON: INNOVATIVE APPROACHES To
INSTrFUTIONAL DESIGN IN DIVIDED SOCIETIEs 71 (2005),
4 TIERNEY, supra, note 5, at68-70.
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These do not amount to arguments that justify secession, and certainly not the
interference in Ukrainian affairs by Russia, but when the issue of political right is
contested, the referendum can take on moral force, and can serve to unsettle
constitutional systems and their self-understanding of the normative underpinnings of the
state. When we look by analogy to other constitutional systems where sovereignty
referendums have been a feature of political struggle, we see that the principle of
democracy emerges as a potential trump card which can bring to the constitutional table a
prima facie entitlement to secession which challenges both established interpretations of
the constitution, and even the supremacyof the constitution itself.
We see this for example in the Quebec Secession Reference. Here, following Quebec's
unsuccessful referendum on sovereignty in 1995, the federal government, formally the
Governor in Council, asked the Court three questions:
(1) Under the Constitution of Canada, can the National
Assembly, legislature, or government of Quebe effect the
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?
(2) Does international law give the National Assembly,
legislature, or government of Quebec the right to effect the
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally? In this
regard, is there a right to self-determination under
international law that would give the National Assembly,
legislature, or government of Quebec the right to effect the
secession of Quebec from Canada unilaterally?
(3) In the event of a conflict between domestic and
international law on the right of the National Assembly,
legislature, or government of Quebec to effect the
secession of Quebe from Canada unilaterally, which would
take precedence in Canada?48
The Court took the view that international law on secession did not apply to the situation
of Quebec because international law "does not specifically grant component parts of
sovereign states the legal right to secede unilaterally from their 'parent' state." 49 This
rendered the third question redundant. The Court therefore focused upon the first
question. In the end, this led to a subtle and complex opinion by the Court which has
indirectly helped to articulate the role which a referendum on secession can play in
instigating the process of constitutional amendment in Canada and on the limitations of
the formal amendment process itself.
" Re Secession supm note 13, at Preamble.
4 1id. at para. 111.
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The way in which the Court envisaged the referendum interacting with the constitutional
amendment process is intriguing. The first step the Court takes is to suggest that in the
event of an unambiguous vote for secession, Quebec's partners in Confederation would
have an obligaton "to acknowledge and respect that expression of democratic will by
entering into negotiabons and conducting them in accordance with the underlying
consttutional principles already discussed."5 0 in other words, it is not simply the case that
Quebec would request negotiations toward a constitutional amendment and the other
provinces could simply refuse to negotiate. Instead, it seems that the negotiations must
respect the will of the majority of Quebecers to secede. This does not mean that secession
is a fait accompli, flowing simply from a Yes vote on secession. As the Court stated, "No
negotiations could be effective if their ultimate outcome, secession, is cast as an absolute
legal entitlement based upon an obligation to give effect to that act of secession in the
Constitution." ,s In contract, it could not accept that "a clear expression of self-
determination by the people of Quebec would impose no obligations upon the other
provinces or the federal government." The Canadian constitutional order "cannot remain
indifferent to the clear expression of a clear majority of Quebecers that they no longer
wish to remain in Canada." Doing so
[w]ould amount to the assertion that other
constitutionally recognized principles necessarily trump
the clearly expressed democratc will of the people
ofQuebec. Such a propositon fails to give sufficient
weight to the underlying constitutional principles that
must inform the amendment process, including the
principles of democracy and federalism. The rights of
other provinces and the federal government cannot deny
the right of the government of Quebec to pursue
secession, should a cler majorityof the people of Quebec
choose that goal, so long as in doing so, Quebec respects
the rights of others. Negotiatons would be necessary to
address the interests of the federal government, of
Quebec and the other provinces, and other participants,
as well as the rights of all Canadians both within and
outsideQuebec.5 2
This Opinion does not expressly state that Quebec has the right to secede from Canada,
but this is a plausible implication of what it does say. To effect secession, Quebec, or any
other province, must negotiate and conclude the process by way of a constitutional
"id. at para. 88.
s'id. at pa ra. 91
2Id. at para. 92(emphasis added).
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amendment, but it is a right to secede nonetheless. Quebec's partners in confederation
seem to have a legal duty to negotiate in good faith toward this outcome.s3
There is nothing stated in the text of the Constitution Act 1982, which tells the federal
government or the provinces that they have such a legal duty. Instead, this right emerges
from the articulation of it by the Court. To make this move, the Court looks beyond the
text of the written constitution, giving considerable importance to "unwritten" or
underlying principles "animating the whole of the Constitution."5  In the Court's view,
there are four "fundamental and organizing principles of the Constitution" which are
relevant to addressing the question of secession: "federalism; democracy;
constitutionalism and the rule of law; and respect for minorities.,5 5 The Court explains,
"These defining principles function in symbiosis. No single principle can be defined in
isolation from the others, nor does any one principle trump or exclude the operation of
any other." Also, "[t]hese principles inform and sustain the constitutional text: they are
the vital unstated assumptions upon which the text is based." In normative terms, these
principles are ascribed considerable significance. They are of interpretive value, 8 as they
are in many constitutions, but beyond this, the Court had earlier found that these
principles could be used to fill gaps "in the express terms of the constitutional text."59 It is
in this context that the Court makes its most startling move, declaring that these principles
"are not merely descriptive, but are also invested with a powerful normative force, and are
binding upon both courts and governments."o60 It is with this status in mind that we must
understand the court's view that these principles must in turn "inform our overall
appreciation of the constitutional rights and obligations that would come into play in the
event that a clear majority of Quebecers votes on a clear question in favor of secession." 1
The obligation to negotiate stems from the unwritten principles of the constitution which
both fill thegaps inthe constitution's textand have the power to bind governments.
" In that regard, I agree withtheargument offered in Zoran Ok opcc's article in this collection. ZoranOk opcic
The idea of Early-Conflict Constitution-Making: The Conflict in Ukraine Beyond TerritorialRights and Constitutional
Paradoxes, 16 GERMAN L1 658, 681(2015).
5 Re Secession, supra note 13, at Preamble.
55 id. at para. 32.
56 id. at pa ra. 49.
5id. at para. 49.
56 id. at pa ra. 52.
Prov5ncia Judges Reference [1997] 3 5.C.R. 3, para. 104 (Can.) (noting that the preamble to the corstitution
rcvites the courts to tum those pnriples into the premses of a constitutional argument that culminates in the
f ling ofga ps in the exprussterms oftheconstitutiona text") (cited byRe 5ecession, supra note 13, at para. 53).
60 Re Secessi on, supra note 13, at para. 54.
61 id. at para. 2.
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It seems that it is the particular symbolic resonance of the referendum as a democratic
event that is crucial to a move which takes abstract constitutional principles, imbibes them
with legally binding force, and transubstantiates them into a concrete duty to negotiate
towards the secession of part of the state. It is pertinent that the duty to negotiate exists
because the "Canadian constitutional order cannot remain indifferent to the clear
expression of a clear majority of Quebecers that they no longer wish to remain in Canada."
It seems unlikely that the Court would come to this conclusion based upon, for example, a
declaration by the National Assembly of Quebec of an intention on the part of the province
to secede. It is the moral force of direct democracy, of the constituent power of citizens
speaking directly, which has produced this result. While the Court insists that none of the
four principles trumps the others, it is the principle of democracy which is used to force the
hand of the other provinces. This does not entirely usurp the established pathways of
constitutional amendment, but it seems to have set a substantive expectation of an
outcome which in effect would require the use of the amendment process to give effect to
the clearly expressed popular will of Quebecers if the other conditions it sets-absence of
ambiguity "in terms of the question asked and in terms of the support it achieves"-are
62
met.
Another recent situation is in Scotland where a referendum was held on independence,
with the consent of the state. In January 2012, when the Scottish Government announced
its intention to hold a referendum, the UK Government responded by arguing tmat the
Scottish Parliament had no legal authority to do so, and it appeared for a time that this
issue would end up before the United Kingdom Supreme Court. In such a scenario the UK
Court would have faced some of the same issues as those confronted by the Supreme
Court of Canada in 1998. But the UK Government conceded the political principle that a
referendum could be held. On 15 October 2012, a deal was reached between the two
governments in what became known as the Edinburgh Agreement. This provided that the
UK Parliament would formally devolve to the Scottish Parliament the competence to
legislate for a referendum on independence, provided that this was held before the end of
Davtd Haljan disagrees, arguing that the duty to negotiate in good faith is simply a duty to be open-minded
about the demand for secession: "A proposal for change is just that: a suggestion." DAVID HALJM,
CONSTITUTIONALISIrG SECESSION 341 (2014). Ths isan unconvincngaccount which is successfully refuted byOklopcic.
See Zoran Oklopcic, The Anxieties of Consent Theofzing Secession Between Constitutionalism and Self-
determination, INTLJ. GRP.& MINORITY Ris. (forthcoming 2015).
63 Gavin Anderson et a1, The independence Referendum, Legality and the Contested Constitution: Widening the
Debate, UK CONSTITUTIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION BLOG (lan. 31, 2012),
http://ukconstitutonal law.org/2012M 11/gavin-a nderson-et-a -the4ndependence-referendum-lega lity-and-
the-contested-constitution-widening-the-debate/ (last visited June 18,2015).
"Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a Referendum on
indEpendence for Scotland, (Oct. 15, 2012),




2014.es This is another example of a state becoming aware that when a sub-state national
group mobilizes with the aim of asserting its own consttuent power, it is very hard to
resist the political right of a people, long recognized as being a discrete people, to exercise
its latent constituent power.
In the eyes of international law, while events surrounding referendums may raise legal
problems, it is intuitively difficult to view a referendum itself as an illegal act. It has to be
said that the United Nations certainly did take this view in relation to Crimea as we have
seen in the overwhelming view of the United Nations Security Council and the Resolution
of the General Assembly, declaring the referendum invalid and affirming Ukraine's
territorial integrity. 6 Similarly, on 27 March 2014, the EU issued a statement to the UNGA
to the effect that it did not recognize Russia's absorption of Crimea.
For others, however, it is not so simple. Jure Vidmar argues both that a "shift of territorial
sovereignty" for Crimea would be illegal and that "even the declaration of independence
violated international law."6 8 He also takes the view, however, that the referendum in itself
was not illegal. He argues that-as a result of the illegalities he speaks of-there is an
obligation to withhold recognition to any purported change in status and this is of course
the established position of the vast majority of states including the EU.70 But it is notable
that he sees the referendum itself as a legal act. If this is the case, or even if a plausible
case can be presented to this effect, it bring into play the constituent power issue which
the Supreme Court of Canada and the UK Government recognized to be irrepressible in the
71
cases of Quebec and Scotland. When such an electoral event takes place, mobilizing a
sub-state people to vote in huge numbers for independence or for some form of territorial
reorganization, the result can become, in legitimacy-based terms at least, a faitaccompli.
This was the story of the Soviet Union's own collapse, as referendums were held in
f Scotland Act 1998 (Modifcation of Schedule 5) Order 2013, para. 3,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uks/2013/242/made (last vsited June 18, 2015).
"G.A. Res.68/262 (Mar. 27, 2014).
67 EU Statement-United Nations General Assembly: Territorial intigity of Ukraine, http://eu-
in.europa.eu/articles/en/artcle 14799 en.htm.
"See also Iure Vdma r, The Annexation of Crimea and the Boundaries of the Will of the People, 16 GERMAN Li.
365, 367-68,383 (2015).
69 Jure Vidmar, Crimea's Referendum and Secesion: Why it Resembles Northern Cyprus More than Kosovo, EiL
TALKI BLO (Mar. 20, 2014),
7" Declaration by the High Representative on Behalf of the EU on Climea (Mar. 16, 2015)
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/03/16-declaration-h-gh-reprEsentative-crimea/.
71 The UK has also recognized that Northern Ireland can secede from the UK to join the Republic of Ireland if a
majorityvoteforthisin a referendum: Northern Ireland Act 1998, si.
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republics which were themselves of questionable legality but which by displaying massive
72
supportfor independence builtthe political momentum to dismember the state.
E. Conclusion
This is not to say that international law should be called upon in an attempt to legitimize
what is clearly an illegal act according to the constitution of Ukraine. It is simply to
recognize that direct democracy is a political move which sub-state actors increasingly
make on account of its power to force the hand of states to shift their approach to the
consttutionality of secession. Internatonal law and international actors have played their
part in giving moral force to the referendum. Badinter Commission Opinion No. 4 is the
clearest example of this.73 The international community allowed the deeply flawed
referendum in Bosnia in 1992 to playa determining role in the recognition of Bosnia when
it was barely viable as a State. The dissolution of SFRY has left the international law
position on the recognition of States deeply unsettled, but one emerging trend is how
influential the referendum can be, both in achieving statehood and in providing the moral
force which would leadto the recognitionof this statehood.
International law, which was always of little assistance in the resolution of territorial
issues, has become even more confusing and contested in light of Kosovo's move to
statehood and the opaque Opinion of the ICJ in response to Serbia's perfectly legitimate
questions about part of its territory seceding with the tacit support and recogniiro of UN
Member States. This also comes at a time when the right to democracy is also an
increasingfeatureof international law.' 4
The Kosovo crisis has also led to the introduction of legitimacy as an actor which nowexists
alongside legality as the metric of appropriate behavior. Given that the referendum was
applied as a legitimizing device in the recognition of new states in Central and Eastern
Europe, it should be no surprise that the referendum has risen to such prominence in the
settlement of territorial disputes.
72 TIERNEY, supra note 5.
7 Followinga request by Bosnia-HerzegDvina for recognition, the Badinter Commission fDund that the absence of
a referendum meant that "the will ofthe peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovna to constitute [a republic] as a sovereign
and independence 5tate cannot be held tolhave been fully established." BadinterCommission, Opinion No. 4.
745te n Wheatley, Modelling Denocratic Secession in /nternational Law, in NATIONALISM AND GLOBPLISATIEt
(Stephen Tiemey ed., 2015) (forthcoming).
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